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Frankenstein's Monster and the Qualitative Experience

Marcela Cañete Vera¹

The most fascinating topic treated in Mary Shelley's novel, *Frankenstein*, is human nature and consciousness in non human beings. The novel's character Viktor Frankenstein plays the role of the inventor of a being brought to life only by artificial means. This creature, though possessing the same physiological characteristics as human beings, has no conscience due to its non human, artificial precedence. However, he is constantly giving signs that he could be regarded as a conscious being, principally because of his use of language throughout the novel that expresses he is actually experiencing qualia. The present research paper will attempt to question the possibility of the existence of qualia phenomena in non human entities, based on the example of Frankenstein's creature. The representation of Viktor Frankenstein's creature in the novel as a subject with qualitative experience raises the question of whether he is conscious or rather an imitator of qualia, thus a philosophical zombie.

KEYWORDS: FRANKENSTEIN, NON-HUMAN, CONSCIOUSNESS, QUALIA, PHILOSOPHICAL ZOMBIE

Mary Shelley's novel *Frankenstein* deals with several attractive topics concerning human nature and other philosophical issues such as consciousness in non human beings. The novel's character Viktor Frankenstein plays the role of the creator of a being brought to life by artificial means. This creature, though possessing the same physiological characteristics as human beings, has no conscience due to

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its non human, artificial precedence. Conversely, he is constantly giving signs that he is a conscious being by means of his words throughout the novel that express he is actually experiencing qualia. The present research paper will attempt to question the possibility of the existence of qualia phenomena in non human entities, based on the example of Frankenstein's creature. The representation of Viktor Frankenstein's creature in the novel as a subject with qualitative experience raises the question of whether he is conscious or rather an imitator of qualia, thus a philosophical zombie.

The concept of 'philosophical zombie' was first used by Robert Kirk in 1974 and was introduced primarily to argue against physicalism as well as to attempt to give some answers to the 'explanatory gap' where human internal experiences cannot be fully explained just by identifying the corresponding physical or neural processes. In the paper "*Sentience and Behaviour*", he explains that it could indeed be theoretically feasible for a zombie to exist—in other words, a person whose mind has been separated from his physical part so that the mind is no longer responding to stimuli but at the same time the body is still replying as a normal person would—. From this he concludes that the mind actually exists and that it is separated from the body. He is basically arguing against the physicalist theory that stated that all mental events are type-identical to the physical events in the brain with which they are associated. In other words, he argues against the idea that mental states are neurological states (Kirk 51).

According to Samuel Guttenplan, physicalism "embodies the idea that mentality can be accommodated within a conception of human beings as complex physico-chemical systems whose behaviour, whose internal events and states . . . re all explainable in physico-chemical terms" (472). In other words, for the physicalist, any type of internal sensation or mental state can be explained in physical terms, everything has a concrete and observable justification. In this sense, the term philosophical zombies— in the area of philosophy— served as imaginary creatures used to illuminate questions about consciousness and its relation to the physical world. A philosophical zombie can be defined as an entity that is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human being but lacks conscious experience (Chalmers 246). Consequently, philosophical zombies are hypothetically constructed creatures stipulated to be identical in certain respects with ordinary human beings, but lacking in other respects. Therefore, a philosophical zombie can be considered as functionally equal to a human being, however, totally lacking in phenomenal states, i.e. states of experiential consciousness. A philosophical zombie then, will sometimes behave precisely as if it were in love or

experiencing pain or even enjoying an ice cream; though it could never really engage with neither of these states, it could never actually ‘feel’ pain or ‘experience’ enjoyment.

Descartes also contributed to this zombie proposal by exploring the idea of a machine which looked and behaved like a human being. He concluded two main ideas that served to argue that machines— or, consequently, non human— beings are not conscious entities: they could not use language creatively and, and they also could not produce appropriate non-verbal behaviour in arbitrarily various situations (Descartes, “Part V”). The fact that a human being is capable using language under no specific rules or equations, playing with its innumerable possibilities and at the same time be creative and innovative is the main feature that separates them from automata. What Descartes tries to affirm is that we are not automata –as non human creations are— and as it would be the case of Frankenstein’s creature. However, there are clear examples in the novel that the monster was definitely able to use language creatively, as he learns by means of listening to other person’s conversations and also with the help of literature. He is in fact a very eloquent being, who is capable expressing his ideas in the most articulated manner using the finest words and advanced vocabulary which is a very attention grabbing aspect of the novel. This reality makes the reader question the monster’s character as a non human being.

Todd Moody offers another remarkable view regarding conscience and philosophical zombies. First of all, he clarifies that given any functional description of cognition, as detailed as one can imagine, it will still make sense to presume that the existence of insentient beings that exemplify that description is possible. That is to say that there could be a behaviourally indiscernible but insentient simulacrum of a human, in simpler words, a zombie (196). Nevertheless, Moody also mentions the possibility of any given behaviour to occur without conscious accompaniments, this theory is called the “Conscious Inessentialism” (196). This theory could offer a possible answer to the fact that the monster can experience mental activity without necessarily being conscious about it, probably because he is only imitating what he has learnt from the close observation of others. Moody goes on presenting a source of support for this theory of conscious inessentialism which comes from cognitive psychology. He states that scientists are finding lately that what happens in consciousness is not essential for understanding mental functioning, more specifically, people recognize each other, they solve problems and use language. Though all these actions have a conscious accompaniment it seems that the real work is not done consciously at all (197). John Searle also supports this view by stating that “as far as the ontology of consciousness is concerned,

behaviour is simply irrelevant. We could have identical behaviour in two different systems, one of which is conscious and the other totally unconscious” (137). A stronger assertion is made by the author of the conscious inessentialism theory, Owen Flanagan, who declares that, while skeptics of Artificial Intelligence worry about the fact that machines cannot be given consciousness, computational functionalism can be read as making this objection completely irrelevant. The mind, according to him, does not require consciousness (Flanagan 309). If this position is taken into account regarding the monster in the novel, it is possible to say that his behaviour throughout the novel— however conscious he may appear— it is not necessarily true that he possesses a conscious mind. If Flanagan’s idea is correct, then, the monster’s behaviour does not depend on whether he is conscious or not.

The subjective conscious experience, also known as qualia, that all humans undergo, has been always an exceptionally interesting phenomenon for philosophers to study. According to Michael Tye, when a person is exposed to experiences such as the smell of a skunk, touching sand paper or feeling very angry, this person is considered to be the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character (“Qualia”). These experiences vary depending on each human being experience, considering that every person in this world is contemplated as unique, and all subjective and personal experiences are, in consequence, unique as well. In the case of Frankenstein’s creature, loads of evidence is given throughout the novel suggesting that he experiences qualia most of the time during the novel. However, it is fair, at this point of the discussion, to reflect about the following idea: if Frankenstein’s monster is a creation born out of dead flesh revived with electricity, it is logical to consider him a non human being since his artificial conception, extremely different from a common human being. Therefore, as a non human creature without consciousness it is not possible for him to experience qualia. As Daniel Denett argues “the way the milk tastes to you . . . how it sounds to you as you swallow . . . these various properties of conscious experience are prime examples of qualia” (226). By using the words ‘conscious experience’ he is confirming that qualia phenomena are in essence conscious states, consequently it must be assumed, at this point, that in order to experience qualia a conscious state is required. Moreover, David Chalmers considers that “given any system that has conscious experiences . . . it will have qualitatively conscious experiences.” (237) In concordance to Denett, Chalmers is in fact asserting that qualia is part of a conscious process, validating the idea that an unconscious being cannot be a qualia experiencer.

Now it is important to state the (im)possibility for the monster to possess conscious states due to the fact that he is a non human being, as was previously discussed. Throughout the novel it is possible to see how Frankenstein's creature narrates several episodes where he *feels* the pain of being rejected by people due to his horrible appearance. The words he uses reveal that he is in fact conscious of his reality, that he will be always discarded by humans because of his bizarre physiognomy.

A very interesting topic of discussion is also proposed by Susan Blackmore who queries studies the idea of whether human beings do really possess an internal, non physical and not observable world or if it is only the product of complicated internal mechanisms. She argues that nowadays better and better machines have been developed to the point that scientists start to wonder if these machines could be conscious or not. "Would they *really* be conscious or just simulating consciousness?" (181). This quite important question has a close relation to the present research if we consider the monster as a machine or even as an artificial Intelligence (AI) being. As Blackmore claims, the wretch, as it is called in the novel, could be either a conscious entity capable of experiencing internal states such as happiness or love precisely as humans do or he may be acting 'as if' he were a human being with consciousness.

According to Searle, the 'computational theory of mind' consists in the fact that many people think that the human brain is a computer and consequently the conscious mind a computer program (437). Searle differentiated two versions of this theory, the Strong AI and the weak AI. According to him, Strong AI would be a computer capable of being even more intelligent than a human and develop a mind as humans do. Accordingly, the weak AI theory, as Searle explains, is about machines that can only 'simulate' the human mind, imitating mental processes and responses such as deciding or suffering. Nevertheless, they can never create "real mind, real intentionality, real intelligence or real Consciousness but only *as if* consciousness" (448). Once more, we find ourselves in the position to consider Frankenstein's creation as an example of Strong AI, however, it could be also possible for him to be only an example of a Weak AI.

As we have already discussed before, Michael Tye states that if we pass our fingers over a coarsed surface, or if we feel extremely irritated, in each of these cases we are subject of a mental state with a very characteristic subjective quality. Philosophers, he states, use the term qualia to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives ("Qualia"). How a person

sees the red color of a rose or what it is like to feel the soft fur of a cat is an internal personal experience that is subjective and proper of human beings which cannot be explained by physical observable means. He complements these ideas by mentioning a famous anti reductionist experiment concerning qualia that appeals to the possibility of zombies—which concern us in this research—. Tye argues that philosophical zombies mean a serious threat to any sort of physicalist view of qualia; if zombie replicas are metaphysically possible “then there is a simple argument that seems to demonstrate that phenomenal states are not identical with internal, objective, physical states” (“Qualia”). However, Tye also mentions that there are two objections to the theories of qualia: the Inverted Spectrum and the Absent Qualia Hypothesis. According to John Locke, Inverted Spectrum is known as the apparent possibility of two people sharing their color vocabulary, although the colors one of them see—qualia—are systematically different from the color the other person sees (83). We may share the same vocabulary for that sense; however, it would be very difficult to prove that it is the same sense of that particular color. This is the main issue discussed in the Inverted Spectrum Theory that poses a clear objection to the qualia theories. A second objection presented against qualia is the Absent Qualia Theory. According to Janet Levin in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, this idea maintains that there could be creatures functionally equal to humans whose mental states have no qualitative character. In Block’s experiment, in order to explain it, he makes us suppose that the whole nation of China was reordered to imitate the workings of a brain—i.e., to act as a mind, according to functionalism—. Each Chinese person would act as a neuron, and communicate by special two-way radio in the right way to the other people. Thus China Brain possesses all the elements of a functional description of mind, say sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and internal mental states causally connected to other mental states. Block’s goal is to show how it is not possible to think that such an arrangement could create a mind capable of thoughts and feelings.

There is a very interesting proposal from Daniel Dennett for the zombie issue and consciousness. In his book *Consciousness Explained* he suggests, apart from zombies the existence of zimboes. As he states, philosophers zombies seem to be able to perform speech acts, report on their states of consciousness and even to introspect: but they are not conscious at all (309). Then he adds that when a zombie ‘reports’ an internal state “this is not a conscious state that is being reported, since they have conscious states, but an unconscious state that merely causes him to go into some further unconscious state that directs the process of generating and executing a so- called speech act

composed of ‘canned; formulae’ (309). He continues his idea of zombie by imagining a more realistic and complex zombie, a zombie which monitors its own activities, including its own internal activities, in an indefinite upward spiral of reflection (310). He adds that “I [he] will call such a reflective entity a zimbo. A zimbo is a zombie that, as a result of self-monitoring, has internal (but unconscious) higher-order informational states that are about its other, lower-order informational states . . . a zimbo is just a zombie that is behaviorally complex, thanks to a control system that permits recursive self-representation” (310). Denett clearly explains the difference between a zimbo and a human being by affirming that unlike these unconscious creatures, humans are constantly rebuilding themselves, discovering new things they want to say as a result of reflecting on what they have just found themselves wanting to say and so forth (310). This could be the case of Frankenstein’s monster, since he may be considered as a complex entity (more than a typical zombie) due to his capacity to self-monitor his activities internally and also reflect on them, though he does this unconsciously.

Emotions are intrinsically related to the human mind, they are all deeply present in the conscience of every person as a type of response to external factors that may affect them. According to Samuel Guttenplan, “It is a commonplace that emotions are in some sense ‘subjective’ . . . they reflect nothing but the peculiar consciousness of the subject” (270). For that reason it is possible to state that emotions are exclusive property of human beings, because of their characteristic as conscious beings. It is then accurate to say that entities that do not possess a conscious mind cannot experience emotions, because this is an exclusive feature pertaining consciousness itself. Throughout the novel the monster goes over several stages of emotion which are strongly related to his manifested internal states: these stages regarded as an indication of the presence or at the same time the absence of consciousness in the monster. Through words, he gives the reader a glimpse of what could be regarded as his qualitative experiences, or also, as simply imitative manifestations of human behavior. Every time the monster expresses internal feelings or emotions in the novel, they can be divided in five main stages—phases he undergoes through the novel— The first can be regarded as the monster’s discovery of nature and its surroundings; the second is about the monster’s observation and reflection towards human behaviour; the third one deals with the monster’s self awareness of his unattractiveness in front of human beings; the fourth stage is the despair at human rejection towards him; and the last one considers the monster’s rage and revenge

against his creator. By the description and analysis of these five stages it will be attempted to reach an agreement in regard of whether the monster can have qualia experiences or not.

In most of the story the monster relates are clearly reflected on words what he feels, thinks or believes. This starts at the eleventh chapter, where, sitting by the fire in his hut, he tells Victor of the confusion that he experienced upon being created. It is in this part of the novel where he sets on a journey into the wilderness and experiences a gradual acclimation to the world through his discovery of the sensations of light, dark, hunger, thirst and cold. This stage of discoveries permits the monster to narrate what it is supposedly going on inside his mind. In the chapter, the monster makes use of several verbs that reflect the discovery phase he is going through: “I saw, felt, heard and smelt at the same time” (118). This process of discovering external factors that affect him as a being would hypothetically give raise to the *activation* of his internal world. By means of basic instincts the monster starts verbally expressing certain feelings, “It was dark when I awoke; I felt cold also, and half frightened, as it were, instinctively, finding myself so desolate” (119). He is principally moved by basic instincts that caused him to use the following words to describe the emotions he felt at that moment:

I walked, I sought a place where I could receive shade. This was the forest near Ingolstadt; and here I lay by the side of a brook resting from my fatigue, until I felt tormented by hunger and thirst. This roused me from my nearly dormant state, and I ate some berries which I found hanging on the trees or lying on the ground. I slaked my thirst at the brook, and then lying down, was overcome by sleep. (119)

It is remarkable to mention the eloquence of the monster’s words when he describes the feelings he undergoes through the whole novel, making it very credible for the reader to consider him as an entity who experiences qualia. These first internal emotions he describes are purely based on basic instincts, therefore, they could be considered as instinctive responses to external factors that directly affected him. The sense of torment because of hunger for example, is strictly instinctive, therefore not conclusive of the fact that he is a subject with qualitative experiences. He uses the word ‘torment’ to reflect what he felt at the moment of feeling hunger, though this could be simply adjudicated to the eloquence he has and the rich vocabulary he has learnt, therefore it is not necessarily true that he really *felt* tormented at that moment. However, the monster also mentions the feelings of pleasure and fear, among others, which are related to experiences that are not part of

basic instincts, such as discovering the light of the fire at night or the fear of feeling alone in the dark. This sensation surprised him and also makes him feel desolate. This could be a sign that the monster was having qualia experiences, or at least as he describes through words. The issue here then is related to the use the monster makes of language. It is possible for him to be only describing events that he confronted as an unconscious entity, and at the moment of telling them he is able to embellish the words and assign them characteristics so that they make the reader believe he is an actual conscious entity. He could be acting *as if* he is conscious through the story he relates, as a philosophical zombie would. Nevertheless, it is also possible for him to be a conscious entity since he was created with the same physical properties of a normal human being. Let us look at the times he may be using imitation as part of a plan in order to be accepted and feel part of a group. Another important part of this chapter is when the monster gives the first signs that he may have the intention to use the resource of imitation in order to feel part of something: “Sometimes I tried to imitate the pleasant songs of the birds but was unable. Sometimes I wished to express my sensations in my own mode, but the uncouth and inarticulate sounds which broke from me frightened me into silence again” (120). As a way of feeling part of something or the necessity of belonging to a certain group makes the monster to start using imitation as a way to get closer to others. This is the first time he uses this resource in the novel, it is here when he first realizes that by imitating others he may be accepted as an equal.

There are other examples that show the reader that the monster’s intentions were to imitate human behaviour through its observation. The following quotation shows that the monster is observing the cottagers in order to learn from them, therefore being able afterward to imitate their manners in order to be accepted: “I would remain quietly in my hovel, watching and endeavoring to discover the motives which influenced their actions” (128). Another significant passage in the novel describing this situation corresponds to the following “What did their tears imply? Did they really express pain? I was at first unable to solve these questions, but perpetual attention and time explained to me many appearances which were at first enigmatic” (129). The previous examples of the monster’s behaviour concerning observation and following imitation are significant at the moment of speaking of consciousness. He literally states that he is learning by observation from human behaviour in order to act the same as them. This is due to his necessity to feel as part of a community of common people, to feel accepted by behaving the same as other humans. Imitation, then, is used by the monster as a resource to act *as if* he were human, thus telling the reader that he is

only a philosophical zombie, unable to experience qualia. The qualia he describes further in the novel are only imitations of what he has observed in others and how they react in front of certain situations.

The second stage the monster undergoes in the novel begins when he starts to closely observe and reflect on human behaviour. This allows him to learn from human nature, their manners, how they react to certain stimuli, how do they behave in general. By learning this, he becomes acquainted to human conduct, which according to him would facilitate his quest of achieving the acceptance of himself as an abnormal creature by the cottagers. This stage starts when the monster meets the cottagers for the first time. At the beginning he starts making conclusions from the observation of the outer appearances of the humans that inhabit the cottage: “Yet she [the daughter] was meanly dressed, a coarse blue petticoat and a linen jacket being her only garb; her fair hair was plaited but not adorned: she looked patient yet sad” (124). Interestingly, the monster is able to identify at this point in the novel, whether a person is patient or sad. This gives the reader clear signs that the monster has been studying the human’s facial expressions and behaviour so he is able to recognize if a person is miserable or not. Through the words used by the monster the reader is also skilled enough to notice that he has also been learning from tones used in oral language by humans and what it means: “as she walked along, seemingly incommoded by the burden, a young man met her, whose countenance expressed a deeper despondence. Uttering a few sounds with an air of melancholy . . .” (125). At the end, after having learnt and being capable of capturing human manners only by observation, the monster becomes a master in this respect. This is crucial to support the idea that the monster is only imitating human behavior through the whole novel, and not acting consciously. The qualia he describes through words corresponds only to replication of what he learns by observation.

All the ideas mentioned before are especially telling in terms of the necessity of the monster to imitate in order to satisfy his need of belonging. Subsequently, it is important to think that by the resource of imitation there is no room for the hypothesis that the monster cannot have a conscious mind; therefore he cannot experience qualia. He is only studying other person’s behaviours and storing these *lessons* in his brain in order to apply them whenever it is necessary for him. However, there is another passage in the novel that is also significant:

He raised her and smiled with such kindness and affection that I felt sensations of a peculiar and over powering nature; they were a mixture of pain and pleasure, such as I had never before experienced, either from hunger or cold, warmth or food; and I withdrew from the window, unable to bear these emotions. (126)

It is clear that by reading the words in the previous example, it would be hard for a person to believe that the monster is only a philosophical zombie who behaves as if he is a human being. In this passage he tells that only through the observation of a human action he felt immediately affected by it internally. He mentions that he could not bear the emotions he experienced at that moment so he had to stop looking at the moving scene. This passage described by the monster makes the reader to strongly question the possibility of believing that he is not conscious. The fact that he may only be imitating a response of what he sees and consequently feel overwhelmed by it makes hard for us to believe it is only simulation and not real feelings, for it would be very hard to imitate a response he had never experienced before. However there is always the possibility that the monster is only using language to convince the reader about the veracity of his internal qualitative feelings, as we have already mentioned.

The third stage deals with the monster's self awareness of his unattractiveness in front of human beings as well as his evident difference from them in terms of physicality. These two characteristics of the monster's phase makes him verbalize how he feels about this, the way it affected him, as he is supposedly a sentient being that can experience qualia. By comparing himself to the cottagers he realizes his ugliness before human physiognomy:

I had admired the perfect forms of my cottagers—their grace, beauty, and delicate complexions; but how was I terrified when I viewed myself in a transparent pool! At first I started back, unable to believe that it was indeed I who was reflected in the mirror; and when I became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster that I am, I was filled with the bitterest sensations of despondence and mortification. (133)

In this quotation, by recognizing his unsightliness before humanity he describes the feeling it provoked in him. He states that he experiences sensations of despondence, despair and mortification. These feelings are proper of a conscious being: as humans also feel in real life when somebody does not have the common physiognomy the common man possesses. This qualitative

experience that the monster describes and asserts he felt at the moment of recognizing himself as hideous and dreadful reveals that he may be have an internal world. However, once again, it is possible that the words and his eloquence, learnt through time, helps him to put in words how a human would feel; therefore, he is using words to imitate a human reaction when confronting this problem. Additionally, he also expresses the feeling of being physically a creature far different from what the human body actually is. This situation also generates in the monster the necessity to manifest qualitative experiences: “I was not even of the same nature as man. I was more agile than they and could subsist upon coarser diet; I bore the extremes of heat and cold with less injury to my frame; my stature far exceeded theirs. When I looked around I saw and heard of none like me . . . cannot describe to you the agony these reflections inflicted upon me” (141). The situation of perceiving himself as different in terms of physiognomy, plus the fact of possessing physical characteristics that are far from the accepted canons of beauty, leads the monster to *feel* as if he is suffering because of this situation. Or, else, he may also be, in fact, suffering about this situation making him a conscious entity. All these events that the monster goes through and the way he puts it in words, as he narrates it in the novel, causes the reader to doubt his quality as a human being or only a philosophical zombie acting as if he perceives and senses as a real person.

A fourth stage, where the monster puts in words feelings and emotions, which makes the reader hesitate on his quality as a conscious being, occurs when he begins to feel the despair at human rejection. This stage happens at the moment when the monster decides to meet the cottagers and introduce himself to them. He is, indeed, very doubtful regarding their reaction, since he is aware of his different appearance and peculiar physiognomy as “[he] had sagacity enough to discover that the unnatural hideousness of [his] person was the chief object of horror with those who had formerly beheld [him]” (157). This first sign of concern that the monster communicates in his narration gives room to question whether he may be a philosophical zombie, acting and behaving as if he felt worried about this situation or else he is as conscious as a human being. The words he uses to express what happens the moment the cottagers see him are the following: “Who can describe their horror and consternation on beholding me? Agatha fainted, and Safie, unable to attend to her friend, rushed out of the cottage. Felix darted forward, and with supernatural force tore me from his father . . . I could have tore him limb from limb, as the lion rends the antelope. But my heart sank within me as with bitter sickness” (161). These sensations of bitterness and unpleasantness caused by the situation described above as part of the monster’s qualia experience, are telling the readers

that he might be considered as a conscious being. He verbalizes how he feels after having a violent encounter with Felix, describing it as a very disagreeable feeling. This would be a normal reaction of a conscious human being and the monster describes it as a normal and obvious reaction in himself too. This could be a proper reaction of a philosophical zombie as we already mentioned, only imitating the way a human would respond to this situation or, he might be experiencing real qualia inside.

Another clear example of this situation presented through the words used by the monster when telling his story is the part when he encounters a child, a boy who rejects him as soon as he beholds his form “‘let me go,’ he cried; ‘monster! Ugly wretch! ... you are an ogre. Let me go, or I will tell my papa.’” (174). These hard words the boy used against the monster caused him to feel the rejection of humanity towards him, making him to express his internal feelings such as despair, sadness and hatred against human beings. The rejection of a community towards a single person who is different from the rest would cause the same feelings in a human being, therefore we can argue that the monster could be behaving either as if he were a normal conscious being or he may also be a conscious being and really experienced his senses at the moment of feeling rejected.

The final stage that the monster undergoes which makes him express his feelings starts in chapter sixteen. It begins with this words “‘Cursed, cursed creator! Why did I live? . . . my feelings were those of rage and revenge . . . ’” (162). This phase considers the monster’s feelings of rage and wish of revenge against his creator, furthermore, against human beings. At this point of the novel, he is not only expressing his hatred and anger against others, but also stating how he has no intentions of controlling these feelings. “‘For the first time the feelings of revenge and hatred filled [his] bosom, and [he] did not strive to control them, but allowing [him] to be borne away by the stream, [he] bent [his] mind towards injury and death’” (165). When talking about the emotion of anger, this can be defined as a mental state that is in its extreme form in the intensity spectrum of anger. This mental state is, for that reason, attributable to humans, because they are the only ones with consciousness. It is, then, important to question the veracity of the rage and hatred the monster feels. If his zombihood is taken into account, he is only imitating loathing with outer expressions such as the moment he destroys everything that is around him. He may put in words what he *feels* inside but the reader cannot be certain that he really feels so, or if he is simply imitating the behaviour of a human being that is rejected by the ones he loves. Moreover, the monster also uses

language to put in words what he has learnt from observation and from books regarding the feeling of rage, just as a philosophical zombie would do.

Many conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the novel in regards to the possibility of considering the monster as a conscious entity with the capacity to experience qualia. One of them is related to the language the monster uses as a resource to appear as a conscious entity. This resource is present throughout the whole story he tells to Victor regarding what happened after he abandoned him. By the use of speech acts he has the power to transmit his internal emotions and qualia as if he consciously experienced them. As it is well known, the monster learned in a very accurate way all the uses of language and how to verbalize feelings by only observing human beings. This allows him to make perfect use of the correct vocabulary to convey what he thinks he feels consciously. Therefore, we can say that the monster, as a philosophical zombie, makes use of verbal behaviour (when telling his story to Victor) in order to imitate human manners. He makes use of his knowledge of language to put these experiences as if they were coming from a conscious mind. As Dennett explains, what the monster does with language is *reporting* an internal state. Let us take the example of the rage he feels about being rejected. This internal state of rage is not a conscious one according to Dennett, since the monster has no conscious states, but only an unconscious one that only causes him to go into some further unconscious states that direct the process of producing and performing a so-called speech act made of previously stored formulae (309). That is why the process of observing, learning and studying human behaviour is so important for the monster.

He, as a philosophical zombie, unconsciously starts to absorb and store as much information as he can by the examination and inspection of the cottagers; thus he has enough resources to behave and become indistinguishable from a human. Besides all these evidences, the monster expresses, literally, in several instances of the novel that he is actually learning in order to imitate and be able to be part of this human group. This idea is clearly presented in the following passage: “As yet I looked upon crime as a distant evil, benevolence and generosity were ever present before me, inciting within me a desire to become an actor in the busy scene where so admirable qualities were called forth and displayed” (151). It is patent here the monster’s unconscious intentions to be an actor and behave as a human being, acting as if he had a conscious mind, as if he experienced qualia, as if he were a human.

There is also another important conclusion that can be made after the analysis of the novel and the theories studied regarding zombies and their relation to the (un)conscious. As we already mentioned, Daniel Dennett proposes another type of zombie, a zombie that has in fact internal, however unconscious, higher-order informational states. That is to say, he is capable of the supervision of his own activities, even the internal activities, as a way of reflection. This advanced type of zombie is called by Dennett a zimbo, a zombie that is behaviourally more complex thanks to a control system that permits recursive self-representation. Frankenstein's monster could perfectly fit in this classification of zombie, because he can be considered as behaviourally complex since he is able to reflect about his internal states too. In most of the story told by him, he is constantly pondering about his own internal states. In fact, according to Dennett, when a zimbo issues a report, expressing its own second-order unconscious state, there is nothing to prevent him from reflecting (unconsciously) on this very state of dealings (311).

Consequently, we can conclude that the monster is in fact a zimbo, or an unconscious being that nevertheless has the capability for higher-order thoughts. Apart from his principal characteristic of being behaviorally indistinguishable from other humans, these other characteristics added by the concept of 'zimbo' make him even more indistinguishable from human beings than ever. Therefore, the wretch's capacity to reflect about his own emotions, allows us to state that he is, throughout the novel, a zimbo; he has the capacity to (unconsciously) feel and reflect about his internal states, as humans do, but in the quality of a zimbo.

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